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WHO NEEDS AN EVIDENCE CODE?: THE NEW




As we move into the next century, New York remains one of
a handful of states without an evidence code.' Since the Federal
Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975,2 thirty-seven states have
adopted evidence codes based squarely on the Federal Rules,3 and
eight other states have codes that either predate the Federal Rules
or are independent of them.4
The law of evidence in New York has not, however, remained
dormant. In the vital field of hearsay evidence jurisprudence,' the
New York Court of Appeals in the past decade has dramatically
reshaped the admissibility landscape through common law
development, leading to an unprecedented increase in the
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. B.A.,
1978, State University of New York at Albany; J.D., 1981, Duke University School of Law.
I am grateful for the encouragement and insightful comments of Vince Alexander, Tony
Amsterdam, Mari Curbelo, Jim Jacobs, Holly Maguigan, Rob Mandelbaum, and Michael
Mushlin. I thank Damaris Marrero for providing invaluable administrative assistance and
support.
I The others are Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia. The law of
evidence in New York emanates from case law and a limited number of statutes. See, e.g.,
N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 45 (McKinney 1992); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 60 (McKinney 1992).
2 See Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
3 They are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington, and Wyoming.
4 Four states have codes enacted prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence (Alabama,
California, Kansas, and New Jersey) and four states have modern codes independent of
the Federal Rules (Georgia, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).
5 See, e.g., People v. Caviness, 144 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1975) (stating that prohibiting the
admission of hearsay is "the best known feature of Anglo-American law"). See also 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 28 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1974) (referring to the rule against hearsay as "that most
characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence-a rule which may be
esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal
system to the world's methods of procedure").
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admission of out-of-court statements.
The tortuous history of codification efforts in New York has
been well-documented.6 One of the primary arguments in support
of codification is that it is the best way to achieve much-needed
reform.7 The underlying theory is that courts are unable, or
unlikely, to effect change through the common law, while the
legislature can write new laws quickly and easily to correct old
problems.' The legislature is seen as the best, if not the only,
vehicle for reforming evidence laws.
Codification opponents aver that statutory codes usually vest
the trial judge with too much discretion,9 which in turn results in
increased admissibility.1" They also argue that involving the
legislature will lead to the politicization of evidence law." This
reasoning assumes that the legislature will react to public pressures
and sentiments by enacting a code-and any subsequent
amendments-in response to those prods, rather than fashioning
rules grounded in fundamental evidence precepts.
Ironically, in the past decade, coinciding with the most recent
failed attempt to pass an evidence code,12 the Court of Appeals has
confounded many of codification's most ardent supporters and
critics alike. The 1990s have witnessed a dramatic change in the
Court of Appeals's approach to evidence, primarily with respect to
hearsay. To the chagrin of codification supporters, the court has
shown itself to be a highly effective agent of reform, and to the
6 See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or not to Codify-That is the Question: A
Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992).
7 See id. at 672-73 ("The desire to reform the law has helped to drive most codification
movements."). Other justifications for an evidence code are that the common law is
inaccessible and that it is not applied uniformly across jurisdictions. See id.
8 See id.
9 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 807 expressly confers residual discretion to
the trial judge to admit reliable out-of-court statements that do not fit within any of the
enumerated hearsay exceptions. See FED. R. EvID. 807.
10 According to those who are against codification, the increase in admissible evidence
comes at the expense of an emphasis on reliability. As Salken points out, the defense bar
has been the most vociferous opponent of codification. See Salken, supra note 6, at 693.
Since defendants do not have the burden of proof, it is logical that the defense bar would
be against any changes that lead to greater admissibility. See id.; see also Faust F. Rossi,
The Federal Rules of Evidence-Past, Present, and Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1271, 1276-77 (1995).
11 See Salken, supra note 6, at 681.
12 The most recent effort ended in 1991. In the hopes of increasing the chances that
the legislature would pass the proposed code, the drafters opted for a conservative
approach that basically attempted to codify existing law, as opposed to a reform-driven
approach that incorporated many of the modernizations contained in the Federal Rules.
The code, nonetheless, never made it out of the Assembly Codes Committee. See id. at
662, 673-74.
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dismay of codification opponents, it has displayed a clear and
undeniable movement toward greater admissibility-a movement
that appears, at least in part, to be a response to public and
political sentiments.
This article shows that the Court of Appeals has altered the
face of hearsay in New York State both by creating new exceptions
and expanding existing ones, resulting in a pronounced trend
toward greater admissibility. More and more. out-of-court
statements that in the recent past would have been deemed
impermissible hearsay are now routinely being admitted. The
consequence is a transformation in the types of evidence that
jurors are permitted to hear and the ways in which trials are
conducted. Part I examines the expansion of existing hearsay
exceptions, focusing on excited utterances and statements made by
witnesses who are unavailable due to the defendant's misconduct.
Part II analyzes the recently adopted present sense impression
exception, and the newly recognized due process catchall for
reliable evidence that does not fit within any presently recognized
exception. Part III evaluates the increased reliance on judicial
interpretations of out-of-court statements as "nonhearsay."
Finally, Part IV analyzes the unintended, but predictable,
consequences of the relaxation of evidentiary standards and
attendant greater admissibility and their implications for the
codification debate.
I. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE OF EXISTING EXCEPTIONS
A. Excited Utterances
To appreciate the expansion of the "excited utterance"
exception, it is necessary to begin with the traditional definition.
Excited utterances are extra-judicial assertions made as the result
of the "declarant's exposure to a startling or upsetting event that is
sufficiently powerful to render the observer's normal reflective
processes inoperative."13 According to one commentator, excited
utterances "are admissible when uttered so spontaneously as to
exclude the idea of fabrication." 4 The rationale for the purported
reliability of these statements is that the excitement or shock of the
event so controls the mind that the declarant is unable to fabricate,
reason, or deliberate. 5 The key elements of excited utterances are
13 People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328,1334 (N.Y. 1996).
14 EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 1000, at 576 (2d ed. 1977).
15 See WILLIAM PAYSON RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 281, at 246-48
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therefore spontaneity and an excited mental state.1 6
Judicial decisions have delineated a number of factors for trial
courts to examine when deciding whether a statement qualifies as
an excited utterance. One consideration is the identity of the
declarant. Cases suggest the intuitive point that people will react
differently to traumatic events." Another factor looks at the
substance of the statement to determine if it is self-serving to the
declarant. Here, the theory is that if the statement is helpful to the
declarant, it is evidence that she or he had time to reflect upon it. 8
Practically speaking, this factor focuses on efforts by defendants to
admit their exculpatory statements as excited utterances. These
exculpatory statements made by a defendant are rarely admitted
as excited utterances. An important question must also be asked:
Just how startling was the event itself? Presumably, the greater
the trauma, the greater the effect on the declarant, thereby
increasing the likelihood that the reflective faculties did not
operate normally. 0
(Jerome Prince & Richard T. Farrell eds., 10th ed. 1973); 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747 (3d ed. 1940).
16 See Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1334-35; see also RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT ET AL., NEW
YORK EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 359 (2d ed. 1998) ("A startling event occurs, an
observer becomes excited, and the observer then makes a spontaneous statement about
the event. The statement's spontaneity is the circumstantial guarantee of the declarant's
sincerity.").
17 For example, a child may more likely be in a continuing state of excitement than an
adult, or emergency medical technicians may less likely be traumatized by various startling
events than other individuals. See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 527 N.Y.S.2d 914 (App. Div.
1988) (examining statements of four-year-old child victim). For an interesting case
focused on the nature of the declarant, see People v. Brooks, 635 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Div.
1995) (dealing with statements made by off-duty police officer).
18 See People v. Irizarry, 671 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that defendant's
exculpatory statements made upon his arrest were made after he had the opportunity to
reflect and possibly to fabricate); People v. Seaman, 656 N.Y.S.2d 350 (App. Div. 1997)
(determining that because defendant had sufficient time to reflect, his exculpatory 911 call
was not an excited utterance).
19 But see People v. Cannon, 644 N.Y.S.2d 311 (App. Div. 1996) (ruling that it was
error to exclude defendant's exculpatory statements made immediately after the bus he
was driving crashed into another car).
20 See, e.g., MICHAEL M. MARTIN ET AL., NEW YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 8.3.3,
at 800 (1997). Note that some have suggested, to the contrary, that statements made
under severe stress may actually be less reliable. See, e.g., CHARLES TILFORD
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297, at 855 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928); David P. Leonard,
Perspective on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 315 (1995); James Donald
Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae Reliability, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 203 (1995).
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The amount of time elapsed between the traumatic incident
and the hearsay statement is another critical factor.21 "In the usual
case ... if the utterance is not made immediately after the event,
the court is likely to find that there was time to contrive and that,
consequently, the declaration was not spontaneous. '2 2 The Court
of Appeals has spoken consistently about "the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been brought fully to
bear by reasoned reflection. '23 The spontaneity requirement, one
of the linchpins that leads to the conclusion that excited utterances
are reliable, suggests as much. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary ("Webster's') defines "spontaneous" as "arising from a
momentary impulse. '24 Indeed, most New York cases use phrases
such as "shortly after, '25  "immediately after,' 26  and "almost
immediately '27 when describing the gap between the excited
utterance and the startling event. While there is no fixed time
limit after which a statement automatically ceases to qualify as an
excited utterance, the underlying rationale for the exception
anticipates an event followed closely by a statement." The longer
21 See MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 297, at 856 ("Probably the most important of the
many factors entering into this determination is the time factor.") (citation omitted); see
also FISCH, supra note 14, § 1000, at 577 ("[Tlhe time interval between the event and the
declaration is a significant factor."); MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.3.3, at 799:
It stands to reason that the amount of time between the startling event and the
hearsay statement is critical to admissibility under the exception. However,
there is no hard and fast rule prescribing the amount of time that may elapse
between a startling event and an excited utterance. Of course, if the statement is
made shortly after the event, the likelihood of the declarant having remained
excited is increased.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22 RICHARDSON, supra note 15, § 282, at 249; see also People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d
1229, 1231 (N.Y. 1979) ("One of the better known exceptions to the injunction against the
receipt of hearsay testimony permits the introduction of [an] ... excited utterance-made
contemporaneously or immediately after a startling event ....") (emphasis added); People
v. Marks, 160 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1959) (defining a spontaneous declaration, New York's
forerunner to an excited utterance, as "a narrative of a past transaction, although usually
of a transaction occurring immediately before") (emphasis added).
23 Marks, 160 N.E.2d at 28 (emphasis added). See People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515,
517 (N.Y. 1987).
24 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1140 (9th ed. 1990).
25 See People v. Williams, 665 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 1997).
26 See People v. Patterson, 662 N.Y.S.2d 803 (App. Div. 1997).
27 See People v. Simms, 665 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1997).
28 See, e.g., People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 1337 (N.Y. 1996) ("While the
statement must have been made before the declarant had the opportunity to reflect, 'the
time for reflection is not measured in minutes or seconds,' but rather 'is measured by
facts."') (quoting Marks, 160 N.E.2d at 28); Brown, 517 N.E.2d at 518 (stating that the trial
judge must take into account the nature of the event, the actions of the declarant in the
period between event and statement, and the amount of time that has elapsed and noting
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the gap between event and statement, the greater the opportunity
for, or likelihood of, reflection and deliberation.
Over time, appellate decisions have indicated that the
permissible time lapse has been quietly, yet steadily, increasing in
length.29 In the past, an appreciable gap between the event and the
statement was seen as a hurdle for the proponent of the statement
to overcome.3" The Court of Appeals reflected this attitude in
People v. Brown.3 After ultimately deciding to admit a statement
made one-half hour after the incident, the court stated, "[w]e hold
only that, under the circumstances here, the lapse of 30 minutes, is
not, as a matter of law, too long. '32 Recent cases reveal a different
approach. Gaps as long as thirty minutes or more are now often
viewed as sufficiently brief intervals to actually be a factor
supporting admission.33
In the recent case of People v. Cotto,34 the Court of Appeals
referred to the "short interval"35 between the event and the
statements and found a series of statements to be properly
admitted as excited utterances.36 Although the majority observed
that the question and answer exchange took place within what it
characterized as a ten-minute trip from the scene to the hospital,37
the dissent implied that the questioning went on for a prolonged
period.3" Indeed, the Appellate Division decision referred to the
statements as being made by the victim "within 30 minutes after he
was shot. '39  A recent case, citing Cotto, noted in favor of
that "the decisive factor is whether the surrounding circumstances" indicate that the
statements were the product of reflection). See also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, §
8.3.3, at 799.
29 This trend undoubtedly induced one commentator to revise her New York evidence
treatise recently by adding a footnote to point out that there is no fixed period within
which the statement must be uttered. See EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK
EVIDENCE 512 (2d ed. Supp. 1998). Previously, her text stated only that "the time interval
between the event and the declaration is a significant factor." FISCH, supra note 14, §
1000, at 577.
30 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, EVIDENCE IN NEW
YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 803(1).1(b), at 608 (1996) ("Early on, the Court
of Appeals applied the time factor strictly.").
31 517 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1987).
32 Id. at 519.
33 See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 653 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1997) (finding statements
made within thirty minutes of shooting to be excited utterances).
34 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
35 See id. at 400.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 400 n.3.
38 See id. at 405-06 (Smith, J., dissenting).
39 People v. Cotto, 658 N.Y.S.2d 278, 278 (App. Div. 1997).
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admission that the statements at issue were made within twenty
minutes.a°
Another important factor that has recently experienced a
liberal interpretation is whether the statements were made in
response to questioning. A question, by its very nature, serves as a
prompt that makes the individual engage his or her deliberative
faculties.4" In this way, it is the antithesis of an excited utterance.
If an individual was able to accurately and coherently answer a
series of questions, it is harder to argue that he or she was too
agitated or traumatized to reflect or fabricate. 2 Again, a reference
must be made to the essential element of spontaneity. Webster's
Dictionary further defines "spontaneous" as "developing without
apparent external influence, force, cause or treatment. 43
The New York Court of Appeals has considered whether
statements made in response to questions can qualify as excited
utterances. In People v. Edwards,44 the court observed that "[i]t is
unreasonable... to prohibit admission of these utterances in every
instance in which they were prompted by a simple inquiry."45 The
inquiry in Edwards-"[w]hat is the matter?"-was simple indeed.
The court also noted that the question was as spontaneous as the
response, and that "[t]o be sure, if the question propounded or the
identity of the questioner may suggest or influence the response or
if it is asked an appreciable length of time after the startling event,
the declarations might very well lack the inherent reliability basic
to the rule. 46  More recently, in People v. Brown,4" the court
permitted the admission of responses to questions, but cautioned
that all courts should examine the nature, extent, and purpose of
the questions as well as the identity, position, and manner of the
questioner. The court explained that these elements should be
examined prior to deciding whether the questions served to
interrupt or moderate the declarant's stress from the shocking
40 See People v. Trotter, 683 N.Y.S.2d 676 (App. Div. 1998).
41 See, e.g., MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.3.3, at 802 ("Responses to questions, as
opposed to spontaneous statements, are viewed with some suspicion because the process
of answering involves at least sufficient reflection to respond appropriately to the
question."); MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 297, at 857 ("Evidence that the statement
was ... made in response to an inquiry, while not justification for automatic exclusion, is
an indication that the statement was the result of reflective thought ... .
42 See People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328,1336-37 (N.Y. 1996).
43 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1140 (9th ed. 1990).
44 392 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1979).
45 Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
46 Id.




The decision in People v. Cotto49 reflects the New York Court
of Appeals's willingness to stretch the definition of an excited
utterance. In Cotto, the declarant, after being shot by the
defendant, got up and tried to run away. He was chased down the
street while the defendant continued to shoot at him. After the
shooting, the declarant made the statements in question to a police
officer and emergency medical technician ("EMT") in an
ambulance en route to the hospital. According to the majority, the
"short interval" between the event and the statements, coupled
with the extraordinary stress of the event, prevented reflection."
Holding that all the statements were admissible, the court
observed that, even though the statements were made in response
to questions, the questions did not serve to interrupt the
excitement of the shooting.5
The following is a synopsis of the questions asked and
answered in the ambulance:
Police officer: "Who shot you?"
Declarant: "I know."
EMT: "You're not doing too good. Why don't you talk to the
officer." [sic]
[Police officer reiterates the EMT's assertion.]
[Declarant provides his name, address, and apartment
number.]
Police officer: "Who shot you?"
Declarant: "Richie."
Police officer: What is "Richie's" last name?
[Declarant does not answer.]
Police officer: "Do you realize that there's a good chance
48 In Brown, the police inquiry appears to have been of limited duration and scope.
The officer asked the victim in the emergency room whether the victim would "tell [him]
who committed the crime," and also engaged in unspecified "further inquiries." Id. at 516.
This comports with the "simple inquiry" upheld in Edwards. 392 N.E.2d at 1228.
Similarly, in People v. Fratello, 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998), the court again observed that
declarations made in response to questioning are not automatically inadmissible. The
questioning involved, however, seems to have been limited to inquiries such as: "Who shot
you?" See id. at 1175.
49 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
50 See id. at 400. The dissent suggests that, given the testimony about the questions
and answers in the ambulance, this interval was not particularly short. See id. at 404-06
(Smith, J., dissenting). The Appellate Division had described the statements as being
made "by the victim in the ambulance within 30 minutes after he was shot." People v.
Cotto, 658 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (App. Div. 1997).
51 See Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 400.
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you're going to die?"52
Declarant: "Yeah."
[Some period of time elapses.]
Declarant: The shooter was "Richie from my building."
Police officer: Was the shooter "Richard Cotto[?]"
Declarant: Yes, it was "Richie from the fourth floor."
Police officer: "Do you realize that there's a chance you're
going to die?"
Declarant: Yes.
Police officer: "Are you sure who shot you?"
Declarant: "Yeah."
[Some period of time elapses.]
Declarant: "Richie Cotto shot me."
Police officer: "What kind of car does he drive, because I want
to make sure we're talking about the same person here.
What kind of car does he drive?"
Declarant: It was a white car. 3
Judge Smith, in his dissent, agreed that statements in response to
inquiries are not prohibited per se, but noted that the "nature,
extent and purpose of the questions and the identity, position and
manner of the questioner" must be examined. 4 Judge Smith
further observed that "[i]t is evident that the witness listened to
multiple questions and proddings of both officer and technician,
reflected upon his answers, deliberated before responding, and
weighed his responses accordingly."55  Judge Smith referred
pointedly to the following testimony given by the EMT when
asked during cross-examination who was the first to name the
defendant as the shooter: "The [declarant] said 'Richie.' He didn't
say it right away. He sort of like thought about it for a few seconds
and then he said 'Richie."' 56 It is inconceivable that the original
formulation of an excited utterance contemplated statements of
52 Arguably, the statements were admissible pursuant to the dying declarations
exception to the rule against hearsay. However, there was no need to reach the
prosecution's alternative argument that the statements were admissible as dying
declarations, since the court held that the trial judge had determined correctly that the
statements were excited utterances. See id. at 399. See, e.g., People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d
109 (N.Y. 1986) (defining dying declarations as statements made while under a sense of
impending death with no hope of recovery).
53 See Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 405.
54 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515, 519 (N.Y.
1987).
55 Id.




A revealing example of this "trauma-trumping" approach,
elevating the nature of the startling event above all other factors, is
found in People v. Simpson. 7 In Simpson, the complainant
testified that the defendant held a box cutter to her throat, stole
her ring, and took her into an alley where he sexually assaulted
her. The complainant told the defendant that she would give him
$100 from her apartment if he would leave her alone. The
defendant held the box cutter against the complainant as they
walked toward her apartment. As they approached her building,
she saw two friends. She pushed the defendant away and ran
toward them, yelling, "Get him!" At first, the complainant and
her friends chased after the defendant, but then she went into her
apartment and called 911. She told the 911 operator that the
defendant had both a gun and a knife. However, at trial she
admitted that she had lied about the existence of a gun. She
explained, "I tried to get the cops there as quick as possible. And I
knew that if I said that there was a gun, that the cops would come
quicker."58
The majority upheld the trial court's admission of the 911 call
as an excited utterance. 9 The court noted that "only about five
minutes elapsed" between the incident and the 911 call, and that
the complainant's intervening activities consisted merely of telling
her friends about the defendant's actions and then briefly chasing
him.60 The most important factor, however, was the nature of the
event, which the court described as "undeniably traumatic."'61 The
court held that it was not improper for the trial court to conclude
that the call "taken as a whole shows by its contents and the
demeanor of the voice ... and the timing of the conversation that
she was very clearly still under the influence of this stressful,
terrifying event, and that . . . overcomes the significance of her
admitted lie." 62
The ease with which the majority dismissed the significance of
the "admitted lie" is troubling. As the dissent observed: "[T]he
fact that the complainant had the cognitive ability to purposely lie
to the 911 operator that the defendant possessed a gun in an effort
to prompt a more immediate police response demonstrates that
57 656 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 1997).
58 Id. at 767.
59 See id. at 767-68.
60 Id. at 767.
61 See id.
62 Id. (quoting the trial judge).
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she was 'acting under the impetus of studied reflection.' 63
These analyses suggest that in virtually any case where the
underlying incident is "undeniably traumatic, '64 statements made
by the victim will be deemed admissible excited utterances. The
extraordinary stress of the event will outweigh all other factors and
result in the declarant being unable to reflect or fabricate,
regardless of the time elapsed, the extent and duration of any
questioning, and even evidence of purposeful deceit.65  This
represents a dramatic shift in the analysis of excited utterances.
Although the Court of Appeals continues to espouse the
traditional "normal reflective process [be rendered] inoperative '66
language as being the essence of an excited utterance, it actually
countenances a far less strict standard. In Cotto, the declarant
certainly reflected on some level. He answered many disparate
questions over a period of time ranging from ten to thirty
minutes.67 Of particular salience is the testimony of the EMT that
the declarant "thought about [the question] for a few seconds and
then" answered.68 Moreover, in Simpson, it can hardly be argued
that the declarant did not engage in some degree of conscious
reflection. The declarant assessed the situation and came up with
a planned approach to her statements. Apparently, it is no longer
essential that the declarant's "normal reflective process [be
rendered] inoperative. '69 Rather, it is sufficient that it merely be
affected in some way.
Further evidence of the Court of Appeals's willingness to
admit statements as excited utterances is found in the lack of
attention the court paid to allegations of the declarants' bias
against the defendants in People v. Fratello° and Cotto. In his
dissent in Cotto, Judge Smith suggested that the allegations of a
"long-standing feud or enmity" between the declarant and the
defendant impacted negatively on the reliability, and therefore
admissibility, of the statements.71 The majority failed to even
63 Id. at 768 (Joy, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 1231
(N.Y. 1979)).
64 See id. at 767.
65 See, e.g., MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.3.3, at 800 (observing that "if the
declarant suffered some physical trauma such as being attacked or shot, a statement made
well after the event may still be an excited utterance").
66 People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (N.Y. 1998).
67 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
68 People v. Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394, 406 (N.Y. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting).
69 Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1334.
70 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998).
71 699 N.E.2d at 406 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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discuss the relevance of those allegations. In Fratello, there was
evidence that the defendant and the declarant, former partners in
crime, had "a falling out... to such an extent that the victim had
allegedly shot defendant and attempted to kill one of the
defendant's relatives. 7 2 Yet, the majority referred merely to the
victim's "claimed bias" against the defendant and held that
"[g]enerally, the bias of an excited utterance declarant functions as
a basis for impeachment of the declaration, thus pertinent to the
weight, rather than admissibility of the declaration. 7 3  Judge
Smith, in dissent once again, argued that the alleged bias and
nefarious character of the declarant made the statements too
unreliable to be admitted.74
In the past, New York trial courts have analyzed the
declarant's motivations in order to determine whether to admit
out-of-court statements as excited utterances. For example, in
People v. Norton,75 perhaps the most salient factor against
admission of the victim/declarant's statements as excited
utterances was that he had a motive to lie.76 The court emphasized
that "it is vitally important to consider whether [the declarant]
had, in addition to an opportunity to reflect, a reason to fabricate a
story implicating the defendant."77
The Court of Appeals has also recognized the importance of
the declarant's possible motivations. In People v. Dalton,78 the
court observed that the defendant had a "powerful motive" to
exculpate himself, and therefore the 911 call did not have the
72 706 N.E.2d at 1179 (Smith, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1176.
74 See id. at 1178-79 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith felt that, given the
questionable reliability of the victim's statements, the court should have required that the
statements be corroborated before they were admitted. See id. For a discussion of the
requirement of corroboration in the context of the analytically similar present sense
impression exception, see infra text accompanying notes 160-63. Given that at trial the
declarant repudiated his hearsay statements that inculpated the defendant and attempted
to exonerate him, Judge Smith also felt that the hearsay statements, standing alone, were
an insufficient basis upon which to convict the defendant. See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at
1178-79 (Smith, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the issues raised by the conflict
between the declarant's out-of-court hearsay and in-court testimony, see infra notes 230-
47 and accompanying text.
75 563 N.Y.S.2d 802 (App. Div. 1990), affid on other grounds, 588 N.E.2d 72 (N.Y.
1991).
76 See id. at 810 (finding that the declarant could well have been motivated by revenge
to fabricate his statements inculpating the defendant).
77 Id. at 808.
78 People v. Dalton is one of the three cases decided by the court in People v. Vasquez,
670 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1996).
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requisite trustworthiness for admission as an excited utterance.79
The Court of Appeals's cursory attention to the declarant's
possible interest and its impact on the reliability of the statements
in both Cottos° and Fratello8t signals a significant departure from
prior analyses and will result in the admission of more out-of-court
statements.
B. Unavailability Due to the Defendant's Misconduct
The New York Appellate Division, Second Department, first
formally recognized this hearsay exception in Holtzman v.
Hellenbrand,s2 and the Court of Appeals gave its stamp of
approval in People v. Geraci.s3 According to these cases, prior
statements of an unavailable witness are admissible if it can be
established "that the defendant procured the witness's
unavailability through violence, threats, or chicanery."' Simply
put, the issue is whether the witness's unavailability is due to the
defendant's misconduct. Although often referred to as "waiver by
misconduct," 5  the underlying rationale is described more
appropriately as "forfeiture dictated by sound public policy."86
Unlike other exceptions to the hearsay prohibition, this
79 See id. at 1337. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 (explaining that statements
made by the defendant often do not qualify as excited utterances because they are viewed
as self-serving). The declarant's possible bias is an important inquiry in other hearsay
contexts as well. One of the prerequisites for finding that hearsay statements are
admissible as declarations against penal interest is that there is sufficient evidence
independent of the declaration to assure its trustworthiness and reliability. See, e.g.,
People v. Brensic, 509 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1987). Courts have declined to admit statements
otherwise appropriately deemed declarations against penal interest when there has been a
showing of a possible motive to lie. See, e.g., People v. Shortridge, 480 N.E.2d 1080, 1083
(N.Y. 1985) (evidence of a "strong ulterior motive" to prevaricate); People v. Settles, 385
N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1978) (evidence of a "distinct possibility" of a motive to lie). For a
discussion of the effect of the interest of the declarant on the admissibility of statements as
present sense impression exceptions to the rule against hearsay, see infra note 164. For a
comparable analysis pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Margaret A. Berger,
The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12
HOFSTRA L. REV. 255 (1984) (discussing whether trial judges may, pursuant to the
prejudicial effect versus the probative value determination mandated by Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, refuse to admit statements that otherwise fit within the requirements of
specific hearsay exceptions).
80 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
81 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998).
82 460 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App. Div. 1983).
83 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995).
84 Id. at 820 (citing Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 596 (App. Div. 1983)).
85 See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).
86 Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 821 (emphasizing that the justification for the rule is premised
on the principle that the law does not permit a person to benefit from his or her own
wrongdoing).
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exception is not grounded in its inherent reliability. 87 Rather, the
exception is a product of the public policy of reducing the
incentive for witness tampering.8" In recognition of the lack of
intrinsic reliability that is the linchpin of other hearsay exceptions,
the Court of Appeals requires, as a precondition for admissibility,
that the defendant's causal misconduct must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. 9 If the prosecution is able to meet
its burden of proof, neither the constitutional right of
confrontation nor the evidentiary rules against the admission of
hearsay precludes the admission of the witness's out-of-court
declarations.
In Geraci, a witness testified before the grand jury that the
defendant had stabbed another man to death. However, shortly
before the trial date, the witness moved out of New York, and
when contacted by the prosecution stated that he would not testify
against the defendant at trial. Following a hearing, the court
admitted the witness's grand jury testimony into evidence, finding
that his unavailability was a result of the defendant's intentional
intimidation."
Although Geraci involved the use of what is generally
referred to as "former testimony,"'" it does not represent an
expansion of Criminal Procedure Law section 670.10, entitled,
"Use in a criminal proceeding of testimony given in a previous
proceeding; when authorized."92 That statute explicitly limits the
use of former testimony to three proceedings: a criminal trial, a
felony preliminary hearing,93 or a conditional examination.94 The
87 See id. at 822. It is arguable that reliability is established due to the defendant's
actions. In other words, why would the defendant cause a witness to be unavailable unless
the witness had relevant, reliable, and damaging information?
88 See id.
89 See id. at 821-22. The court specifically declined to follow the lead of some federal
circuit courts, which utilized the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard. See id.;
see, e.g., Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273; Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982).
This hearsay exception was codified in 1997 in Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Rule provides that the rule against hearsay does not bar admission of "[a]
statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." FED. R.
EvID. 804(b)(6). The Advisory Committee Note to the 1997 Amendment to Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6) states that the "preponderance of the evidence standard has been
adopted in light of the behavior the new rule 804(b)(6) seeks to discourage." FED. R.
EvID. 804 (b)(6) advisory committee's note.
90 See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 823-24.
91 See id. at 822-23.
92 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10 (McKinney 1992).
93 See id. § 180.60.
94 See id. art. 660. The testimony in these three proceedings was deemed reliable
[Vol. 21:211
RADICAL RE-EVALUATION OF HEARSAY
court in Geraci was not concerned with statutory interpretation
and did not add to the ambit of section 670.10. 91 Rather, the
holding in Geraci is an explicit recognition of this public policy
exception to the traditional rule against hearsay.96
The breadth of this exception cannot be overstated. Even
though Geraci was concerned with sworn grand jury testimony, the
types of extrajudicial statements admissible under this rule are
vast. Since admission is not premised on inherent reliability, it is
not necessary for the statements to have been made under oath,
subject to cross-examination, or to have any sort of traditional
indicators of reliability.
The nature of the circumstances that led to the creation of this
exception invariably results in complex issues for the trial court to
decipher. The essential difficulty for the prosecutor is proving the
defendant's misconduct when she does not have a willing,
cooperative witness. For example, assume that the prosecutor
believes she has a knowledgeable and compliant witness. A few
days before the scheduled trial date, the prosecutor calls the
witness to review the incident, and to her surprise the witness says,
"What case? I forgot all about that. I don't remember anything
about it." The prosecutor will likely suspect foul play and ask the
witness if anyone has threatened her about testifying. The odds
are, if the witness was in fact threatened, and scared enough to tell
the prosecutor that she does not recall the incident, she will likely
not admit it to the prosecutor. The prosecutor's task is then to
prove the defendant's misconduct without the cooperation of the
affected witness. In recognition of this dilemma, the court in
Geraci provided that, "given the inherently surreptitious nature of
witness tampering," circumstantial evidence may be used, in whole
or in part, to establish the defendant's misconduct,97 and the
because in each case the declarant was subject to cross-examination. See infra notes 174-
76 and accompanying text.
95 Cf. Peter Preiser, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
670.10 (McKinney Supp. 1999). Interestingly, the Court of Appeals's recent expansive
pro-admissibility approach to hearsay does not encompass statutory analysis. Section
670.10 has consistently been interpreted strictly so that testimony at pretrial suppression
hearings, at civil proceedings, and even in the grand jury, continues to be impermissible
hearsay if offered within the exception for former testimony codified by section 670.10.
See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 553 N.E.2d 960, 963 (N.Y. 1990) (pretrial suppression hearing
regarding the constitutionality of the identification procedures used by the police); People
v. Harding, 332 N.E.2d 354, 356-57 (N.Y. 1975) (testimony from the police officer
defendant's departmental hearing).
96 See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 822-24.
97 Id. at 823.
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prosecution is permitted to meet its burden through the use of
hearsay testimony.98
Like many precedent-setting cases, Geraci created as many
problems as it purported to solve. For example, consider the
following variations of "unavailability:" (1) the witness disappears
and cannot be found; (2) the witness is located but refuses to speak
with the prosecutor or refuses to come to court; (3) the witness
testifies in court, but repeatedly answers, "I don't recall"; or (4)
the witness testifies inconsistently from his or her prior statements
and/or makes a direct effort to exonerate the defendant.
Another question that remains unanswered after Geraci is:
What does it mean for unavailability to be "procured by the
defendant?"99 If a witness is threatened while the defendant is in
jail, any misconduct is not directly attributable to the defendant.
What if a friend of the defendant decides under his own volition to
threaten the witness? What if a witness hears generally about the
defendant's reputation for violence and becomes afraid to testify?
If it is not necessary to prove that the defendant personally
performed the misconduct, the question then becomes whether it
is sufficient to show that the misconduct is attributable, directly or
indirectly, to the defendant, or that the defendant somehow
condoned, or acquiesced to the misconduct.
In People v. Cotto,1° the court was confronted with the task of
defining the parameters of clear and convincing evidence. What
sort of evidence suffices to establish that the defendant's
misconduct caused the witness to be unavailable? According to
the prosecution, an eyewitness to the homicide who knew the
defendant could testify that he saw the defendant shoot the victim.
Just prior to the trial, the eyewitness told the prosecutor that his
family was "in jeopardy," that "everything [wa]s off," and that he
would not testify at trial. 1 The next morning, the prosecutor
spoke with the eyewitness, who promised to testify truthfully.
However, later that day, when called to the stand, the eyewitness
claimed that he could not identify the shooter and he explained to
98 See id. at 823 n. 4 (addressing, but not ultimately deciding, whether hearsay may be
used to establish the requisite misconduct); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that
when deciding the admissibility of evidence, the court is not bound by the rules of
evidence, except those with respect to privileges); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624,
629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[O]ften the only evidence of coercion will be the statement of the
coerced person, as repeated by government agents.").
99 Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 823.
100 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
101 See id. at 396.
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the judge that he was concerned for his family's safety. 2 The
prosecutor informed the court that the eyewitness had told him
that some men had approached his family and had given thern
"reason to believe that there was a 'contract' out on [his life]." 103
As a result, the trial court ordered a hearing to explore the
allegations of misconduct.
The ensuing hearing reflects the Pandora's box that these
cases have opened. The prosecution in Cotto called two police
officers to the stand. The first officer testified that the eyewitness,
after obtaining information from his fianc6e, had told him that
"someone had approached his mother and sister and inquired as to
his whereabouts.'"104  The second officer testified that the
eyewitness's sister told him that "unidentified people"'' had
approached her and asked where her brother was being housed in
jail. The officer testified further that the sister said that the "'word
on the street' was that her brother 'was talking."" 6  However,
when called to testify by the prosecution, both the eyewitness and
his sister failed to support the police testimony and, in fact, denied
making the statements attributed to them. Finally, the prosecution
called the eyewitness's mother, who testified that her daughter had
told her that someone had stopped her on the street and asked
whether her brother was in jail.
Faced with denials by those who allegedly spoke about being
threatened, the trial court nevertheless found that the prosecution
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that threats had been
made. 07 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
Appellate Division and the trial court, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to conclude that threats were made as well as
enough evidence to link the threats to the defendant.' The
dissent argued that "[u]nder the authority of this case, vague
allegations of 'word on the street' combined with tales of
unsubstantiated visits by unnamed individuals will suffice to
102 See id. The eyewitness told the judge:
Spanish Harlem is a small place, okay. My family lives there. All right. I don't
live there. Okay. [The victim] was a friend of mine, a good friend of mine. All
right. Now, see, I got to think about my family, all right. Even though I'm not
going to live there, my family is going to be there, you know what I'm saying.
Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
105 See id. (emphasis added).
106 Id.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 397-400.
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establish clear and convincing evidence of a defendant's unlawful
interference with a witness."'' 9
The decision in Cotto marks a profound expansion of Geraci.
While the majority often referred to Geraci, the facts of the two
cases are substantially dissimilar. In Geraci, it was the defendant
himself who approached the witness and told him that his attorney
wanted to discuss the case with him. In addition, the defendant's
uncle, a known person, spoke with the witness and promised him
several thousand dollars. Indeed, by the time of the trial, the
witness had already received $2,000. The evidence of misconduct
in Cotto pales in comparison. Although he was out on bail, there
was no evidence that the defendant himself had committed acts of
misconduct, and there was no evidence of any actual direct threats.
Moreover, in Cotto, the people alleged to have made threats were
never identified." ' The Court of Appeals in Geraci rejected the
preponderance standard and stated that a higher standard was
necessary in order "to assure a great degree of accuracy in the
determination of whether the defendant was, in fact, involved in
procuring the witness's unavailability for live testimony";"' yet the
court's holding in Cotto appears to countenance a far less stringent
standard in practice.
Cotto is also significant with respect to the nature of the out-
of-court statements that were admitted into evidence-they were
unsworn statements that the witness made to a police officer and a
detective. Although Geraci did not limit its holding in this way, it
is important to bear in mind that it involved the admissibility of
the witness's grand jury testimony, which was given under oath
and therefore had additional indicia of trustworthiness.
Recognizing the necessarily amorphous quality of standards such
as "clear and convincing," it nevertheless seems that if the hearsay
109 Id. at 404 (Smith, J. dissenting).
110 See id. at 396. The court emphasized that the defendant was out on bail and
therefore had the opportunity to arrange the threats, and that the defendant had
threatened the witness at the time of the crime by looking at him and pointing a gun in his
direction. See id. These facts, and others, were held to clearly and convincingly link the
defendant to the threats. See id. The impact of the holding in Cotto is magnified by the
harshness of the remedy fashioned by the trial court and upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Following the federal rule, the court held that the defendant forfeited his right of
confrontation for all purposes. Accordingly, the defendant was not permitted to cross-
examine the witness on any subject.
111 People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995). The court further observed that
"our statutory and decisional law counsels a cautious approach that permits use of the
exception only when the predicate facts are proven with the degree of certainty that the
'clear and convincing evidence' test assures." Id. at 822-23.
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the prosecution seeks to admit under this exception is unsworn,
the requisite clear and convincing proof should be crystal clear.
Other scenarios reveal the complexities and potential far-
reaching consequences of this hearsay exception. In People v.
Johnson,12 the defendant was charged with rape, sodomy, and
endangering the welfare of a child.113 The defendant, a pastor,
allegedly became involved in a sexual relationship with a thirteen-
year-old parishioner. The victim's mother had become suspicious
about the relationship between the defendant and her daughter
and forced her to get a pregnancy test. While awaiting the results,
she took her daughter to the police, whereupon the child was
interviewed for four or five hours. The victim initially denied any
sexual relationship with the defendant. However, when her
mother confronted her with the positive results of the pregnancy
test, she admitted that she was involved in a sexual relationship
with the defendant. At the insistence of the police and her
mother, the victim called the defendant. During the taped
conversation, the defendant tacitly acknowledged their sexual
relationship and repeatedly urged the victim to protect him by
lying about their relationship. Meanwhile, the police went to the
church and arrested the defendant.
The victim testified extensively to the grand jury, but at trial
she refused to answer questions by repeatedly responding, "I have
nothing to say." '114 The victim's only explanation for her refusal to
testify was, "[b]ecause I choose not to.." 5 The prosecutor moved
for admission of her grand jury testimony on the theory that the
defendant's misconduct caused the witness's unavailability at
trial. " 6
While the appeal focused primarily on the necessity of a
formal hearing on the allegations of the defendant's malfeasance,'17
the Johnson case flags the overarching issues of what constitutes
"unavailability" and what constitutes "misconduct.""11  The
declarant in Johnson was present in court, but chose not to answer
questions. Moreover, she did not explain her reason for that
112 711 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1999).
113 See id. at 968.
114 People v. Johnson, 673 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757 (App. Div. 1998) affd, 711 N.E.2d 967
(N.Y. 1999).
115 Id.
116 See Johnson, 711 N.E.2d at 968.
117 See Johnson, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (reversing the conviction on the grounds that the
trial judge failed to hold a formal hearing as this hearsay exception absolutely requires).
118 See id. at 756-60.
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refusal. 19 Although there were no allegations of threats of any
kind, the trial court found that the defendant had "induced" the
witness's refusal to testify.1 20 The central issues became whether
the defendant's alleged malfeasance must postdate the date of
arrest, and whether it must involve threats, fear, or intimidation of
physical harm. 2' Surely, the witness's refusal to testify was
attributable to the defendant. The questions that remain are
whether there must be post-arrest actions by the defendant that
are intended specifically to deter the witness from testifying, and
whether misconduct of the psychological sort alleged here is
sufficient. 22
Still another critical issue concerns the court's use of the act
for which the defendant is on trial as the predicate misconduct
necessary to permit introduction of the victim's hearsay
statements. For example, in People v. Maher,23 the defendant was
charged with the murder of his "estranged paramour.' 1 24 The trial
court admitted statements made by the victim to police and
hospital security officers regarding prior violent acts and threats
the defendant directed at her.25 The New York Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the defendant's conviction
and upheld the admission of the victim's statements under the
authority of Geraci.126  The reasoning presumably was that the
defendant's misconduct caused the victim's absence. The Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and held that admitting the
statements was an "unwarranted expansion" of the Geraci
119 Contrast this version of "unavailability" with the one contemplated by the genesis of
this exception-the witness has disappeared and is presumed dead. See, e.g., United States
v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (the witness was murdered).
120 See Johnson, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
121 Again, one must consider that the origins and most common uses of this hearsay
exception are in cases where there are threats of physical harm to the witness or his or her
family.
122 See Johnson, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 759:
Moreover, we acknowledge that in a very real, albeit global sense, the victim's
unwillingness to cooperate is a direct consequence of, or at least inextricably
connected with, the misconduct of which defendant stands convicted. We are
constrained, however, by the fact that we sit not in moral, but legal judgment.
Id; see also People v. Concepcion, 644 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 1996) (finding no evidence
that the defendant had committed any post-arrest misconduct to induce his mother not to
testify); cf. id. at 762 (Peters, J., dissenting) ("His admonishment to her [made while on the
phone with her just 'prior to his arrest] that only her words could send him to jail, silenced
this child as surely as if he had cut off her tongue.").
123 677 N.E.2d 728 (N.Y. 1997).
124 See id. at 729.
125 See id. at 730.
126 See id.
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exception."' The court reasoned that admission of the statements
would result in a rule permitting the use of the victims' statements
in all homicides and, significantly, that there was "not a scintilla of
evidence that the defendant's acts against the absent witness were
motivated, even in part, by a desire to prevent the victim from
testifying against him in court."" 8 Apparently, as long as the
motive for the murder is homicidal rage, or anything except a
desire to prevent the victim from testifying in court, the Geraci
exception is inapplicable. The facts and decision in Maher are not
sui generis.
The case of People v. Flowers129 presents a slight variation on
Maher. In Flowers, three indictments were consolidated for trial.
The defendant was charged with assaulting the victim on two prior
occasions, and then with murdering her. At trial, the court
followed the rationale of Geraci and permitted the prosecution to
admit the deceased's grand jury testimony from the first assault
indictment. Although the New York Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, found that the testimony was erroneously admitted,
the court did not even comment on the propriety of the
prosecutor's attempt to admit the deceased's statements by
asserting, essentially, that the defendant was guilty of the crime
charged. 130 Rather, the court merely noted that there was "no
evidence that defendant's acts against the victim were motivated
by a desire to prevent her from testifying. "131
These types of cases are proliferating. They are not limited to
situations where a witness has disappeared, and will surface
whenever a witness appears recalcitrant or answers questions in a
manner that leads a prosecutor to suspect foul play. The exception
is also not limited to cases where there is clear and convincing'
evidence that the defendant himself threatened the witness. The
inquiry is necessarily more expansive, examining whether the
defendant directly or indirectly caused the witness to be
unavailable, or whether the defendant acquiesced in the
misconduct. Furthermore, the exception is not clearly limited to
post-arrest threats of physical harm. Courts are considering
whether the nature of the relationship between the defendant and
the witness, which existed prior to the arrest and is often part and
127 See id.
128 Id. at 731.
129 667 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1997).
130 See id. at 547.
131 Id.
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parcel of the instant charges, is such that the witness's
unavailability can automatically be attributable to the defendant's
misdeeds.1 32  The expansion of this concept-that evidence
otherwise inadmissible will be permitted if there is sufficient
evidence of the defendant's misconduct-is especially worrisome,
given that the exception is not premised on the intrinsic reliability
of the statements.
II. CREATING NEW EXCEPTIONS
A. Present Sense Impression
The "present sense impression" exception to the rule against
hearsay was recently adopted by the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Brown . 3   The court held that "spontaneous
descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with
the observations are admissible if the descriptions are sufficiently
corroborated."'34 Unlike excited utterances, the event itself can be
perfectly unremarkable and the declarant need not be startled or
excited in any way. Present sense impressions are deemed reliable
because the contemporaneity of the communication minimizes the
opportunity for calculated misstatement as well as the risk of
inaccuracy from faulty memory.35 Thus, the key components of
the present sense impression exception are contemporaneity and
corroboration.36
The declarant in Brown was a caller to 911. He left an
incorrect name and telephone number and was therefore, for all
intents and purposes, anonymous. However, this did not deter the
court from permitting the statements to be received into
evidence.'37
132 Significantly, the 1998 legislative program of the New York State judiciary urges the
legislature to amend Criminal Procedure Law section 60.25 to permit a third party to
recount a witness's prior identification of the defendant when, because of fear, the witness
is unwilling to identify the defendant in court. See The Judiciary's 1998 Legislative
Agenda, April 1998 (on file with author); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.25
(McKinney 1992). Under common law, it is impermissible bolstering for a witness,
typically a police officer, to recount a witness's prior identification of a criminal defendant.
The statute presently recognizes an exception to this prohibition when the witness is
unable, on the basis of present recollection, to identify the defendant in court. See id.
'33 610 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1993).
134 Id. at 373.
135 See id. at 371-72; People v. Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (N.Y. 1996).
136 See Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1334.
137 The court's willing acceptance of anonymous information is noteworthy given the
court's uneasiness with anonymous information in other contexts. For example, the court
has held that a finding of probable cause can be based on anonymous information only if
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Brown left open the question of whether the present sense
impression exception requires that the declarant be unavailable. 3
The only reference to the issue was in a footnote pointing out the
difference between the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
proposed New York Code of Evidence of 1982.139 This nascent
hearsay exception was expanded considerably in People v. Buie.14"
Following the lead of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court in
Buie held that "the present sense impression exception does not
require a showing of the declarant's unavailability as a sine qua
non to admissibility. "141
Given that unavailability is not required, the issue now
becomes whether the admission of the out-of-court statement
amounts to improper bolstering. New York courts have long
recognized the prohibition against bolstering testimony by the use
of prior consistent statements.142 Prior consistent statements are
permitted only as a response to a claim of recent fabrication.
1 43
Judge Bellacosa, writing for the majority in Buie, stated that the
rule against bolstering was inapplicable essentially for two
reasons.44 First, the nature of present sense impressions differs
from that of typical prior consistent statements.'45 It does more
than merely repeat the in-court testimony; rather, it adds an
experiential element.14 6 The jury is able to experience the crime as
it unfolded in a way that is not mimicked by in-court testimony.
147
the prosecution establishes the informant's reliability and basis of knowledge. See, e.g.,
People v. Chase, 650 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Parris, 632 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1994);
People v. Adrion, 627 N.E.2d 973 (N.Y. 1993); People v. DiFalco, 610 N.E.2d 352 (N.Y.
1993); People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985); People v. Elwell, 406 N.E.2d 471
(N.Y. 1980).
138 The declarant in Brown, a 911 caller, gave an incorrect name and telephone number
and as a result was unavailable. See Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 371.
139 See id. at 371 n.1 (stating that the proposed New York rule, unlike the Federal Rule,
required that the declarant be unavailable as a witness).
140 658 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1995).
141 Id. at 195. The present sense impression exception is in section 803 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, entitled "Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial."
See FED. R. EvID. 803(1). The closely related excited utterance also does not require that
the declarant be unavailable.
142 See, e.g., Buie, 658 N.E.2d at 192; People v. Seit, 653 N.E.2d 1168 (N.Y. 1995);
People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1993).
143 Prior consistent statements received in evidence to rebut a claim of recent
fabrication are admitted to rehabilitate the credibility of the witness, not for the truth of
the matter asserted. See, e.g., BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, § 801(1).2(b), at
561.





Second, the bolstering concept is inapplicable because the out-of-
court statements are admissible under an independent hearsay
exception. 48 While the statements might be inadmissible under
the prior consistent statement exception, they may still be
admissible pursuant to a "different, better-fitting exception." '149
After Buie, the immediate result was a proliferation of cases where
the declarant testified in court and his or her out-of-court
statements, which were typically in the form of a 911 call, were
also admitted into evidence."'
This analysis has far-reaching implications. A typical criminal
case involves the testimony of a police officer. At the conclusion
of the officer's testimony, the prosecutor might move to admit into
evidence a variety of the officer's reports, which were filled out
based on personal, firsthand knowledge. One would expect the
defense attorney to object and claim that the reports constitute
improper bolstering by prior consistent statements. Surely, the
prosecutor should respond by citing Buie for the proposition that
the reports are admissible under an independent hearsay
exception (business records) and that the bolstering argument is
therefore inapplicable. 51
Surprisingly, but perhaps in response to the vast number of
extra-judicial statements being admitted as present sense
impressions, the court applied a more restrictive analysis in People
v. Vasquez.'52 In Vasquez, a trio of cases consolidated for appeal,
the court held that hearsay statements offered by defendants did
not qualify as present sense impressions. 53 First, the court held
that the statements were not sufficiently contemporaneous.
While the court conceded that "there must be some room for a
marginal time lag between the event and the declarant's
description of that event," '55 it still required near simultaneity. The
148 See id. at 197-98.
149 Id. at 198. Once deciding that the statements fit within the present sense impression
exception, the trial court should then engage in an examination of relevance and also
weigh the probative value versus the prejudicial effect. See id.
150 See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
151 See Buie, 658 N.E.2d at 197-98. There may be other independent grounds for
exclusion of the police records. Courts distinguish reports that are accusatory in nature
and bear directly upon the defendant's guilt from those that are routine and administrative
in nature. The former affect the defendant's confrontation rights in ways not implicated
by the latter. See, e.g., BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, § 803(3).1(b), at 638-39.
152 670 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1996).
153 See id. at 1330.
154 See id. at 1335-37. This also was essentially the holding in the two other cases.
155 Id. at 1334.
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court noted that in People v. Brown, the original definition of
present sense impression required that statements be made
"substantially contemporaneously" with the observations.156
However, two questions remain: (1) what is "substantially
contemporaneously;" and (2) what, if any, time lag between the
event and the statement is permitted?' The Court of Appeals's
expansive view of the temporal element in similar contexts
indicated that the court would use an elastic approach to define
the parameters of substantial contemporaneity. 158 Nevertheless,
Vasquez emphasized that present sense impression statements are
reliable precisely because the contemporaneity minimizes the
opportunity for calculated misstatements or inaccuracies of a
faulty memory. Thus, since contemporaneity is the linchpin, any
gap between the observations and the communications erases the
assurance of reliability.
The Vasquez court further held that there was insufficient
corroboration.159 While stating that it was impossible to spell out a
general rule to define adequate corroboration, the court noted that
"in all cases the critical inquiry should be whether the
corroboration offered to support admission of the statement truly
serves to support its substance and content." 60 Although Vasquez
did not define the requirements of corroboration, it signified that
the corroboration requirement should be construed strictly.
Even though the court in Vasquez reined in the seemingly
runaway present sense impression train, on closer reflection and
analysis that result is not so remarkable, given the uneasiness the
court displayed when it initially adopted the exception in Brown.
At that time, the court chose to require corroboration. Several
other hearsay exceptions do not require corroboration. The
premise is that if the hearsay is reliable, then corroboration is not
necessary. Further, excited utterances, which have been referred
to as "close cousin[s]"''11 of present sense impressions, have no
corroboration requirement. Similarly, the Federal Rules of
156 See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373 (N.Y. 1993).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding a statement
made within a few minutes of the event to be within the present sense exception). See
generally FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (referring to statements made "while the declarant was
perceiving the condition or immediately thereafter").
158 For example, with respect to excited utterances, see supra notes 21-40 and
accompanying text; with respect to prompt outcry, see infra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text.
159 See Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1335.
160 Id.
161 See People v. Buie, 658 N.E.2d 192, 195 (N.Y. 1995)
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Evidence's present sense impression exception does not explicitly
mandate corroboration. 62 It appears that the court was saying, in
effect: We will adopt this exception because we believe that these
statements are reliable, but since we are not entirely convinced, we
will require an additional guarantee of trustworthiness in the form
of independent corroboration.1 63 With that background in mind, it
is hardly shocking that Vasquez applied a stricter standard to
qualify statements as present sense impressions.164
Although it is becoming increasingly rare for a criminal case
not to contain some reference to a present sense impression,
especially when 911 calls are involved, questions persist about the
underlying rationale of this exception.'65 Indeed, Dean Wigmore
opposed the present sense impression exception, asserting that
only a traumatic or startling event guaranteed trustworthiness, and
that spontaneity and contemporaneity were insufficient guarantors
of reliability.1
6
Consider the facts in People v. Dingle:'6 7 A woman observed a
man climbing through the window of a building directly across the
162 See FED. R. EvID 803(1); cf. Daniel J. Capra, Present Sense Impressions, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 12, 1993, at 3, 35-36 (arguing that a careful reading of Rule 803(1) in conjunction with
Rule 104 reflects the fact that the trial judge has discretion to require independent
evidence that the event occurred in the manner described by the declarant).
163 The defendant in Brown argued that the court should require corroboration in the
nature of an "equally percipient witness." Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 373. The prosecution
argued that the statement was inherently reliable and that therefore no corroboration was
necessary. See id. at 374. The court apparently adopted a middle ground requiring
"sufficient" corroboration. See id.
164 The court has not directly addressed the extent to which the interest of the declarant
should be taken into account when the trial court decides whether there was adequate
corroboration. In one trial court case, the judge declined to admit statements as present
sense impressions due to the potential interest of the declarant, even though they were
made substantially contemporaneously and were corroborated. See People v.
Anonymous, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1996, at 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (McMahon, J.). Certainly, that
sort of inquiry already occurs in other hearsay contexts. Statements offered by defendants
as excited utterances are often rejected due to a determination that they are self-serving
and therefore indicative of reflection. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
165 See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, § 803(1).1(a), at 607 ("New York cases
on the present sense impression are beginning to proliferate."); see, e.g., Faust F. Rossi,
Evidence, 48 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 659, 669 (1998) ("New York's acceptance of the present
sense impression has opened the door to a large number of tape recorded conversations;
mostly 911 telephone calls.").
166 See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1757, at
236-40 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1976). Similarly, acceptance of the underlying
reliability of excited utterances is by no means unanimous. Some question the underlying
premise for admission of excited utterances and imagine that the stress from a startling
event might render something someone says to be less accurate and reliable. See supra
note 20.
167 665 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div. 1997).
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street from her apartment. She immediately called 911, reported
the crime, and described the man. This call is quickly becoming a
hallmark, prototypical present sense impression. However,
"[b]ecause she was nervous and unsure of the address of the
building, she gave the emergency operator several different street
numbers. Less than two minutes later, the witness called the 911
emergency number again to clarify the address and give a more
detailed description of the intruder.' 1 68
The above fact pattern is easy to imagine. The 911 caller
would be anxious, and would begin to scrutinize the situation only
after hanging up the phone and composing herself. Yet, the
Vasquez analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that only the
first, less reliable 911 call is admissible. As one commentator
pointedly observed, "[present sense impression] will tend to admit
the statements of those who are prone to rush to judgment and
exclude the statements of those more careful persons who wait,
albeit momentarily, to comment upon an event."'69
B. Due Process/Reliable Evidence
In the 1997 People v Robinson7 ' decision, the Court of
Appeals again broke new ground. This time, evidence favorable
to the defense was implicated. 171 Robinson held that due process
required that the defendant was entitled to the admission at trial of
the grand jury testimony of a defense witness who was no longer
available. 171
The facts in Robinson are as follows: The defendant was
charged with rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first
168 Id. at 585.
169 Daniel J. Capra, Present Sense Impression and Excited Utterance, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13,
1996, at 4.
170 679 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1997).
171 Although the excited utterance exception is not on its face more readily available to
the prosecution than the defense, it is utilized to a much greater degree by the
prosecution. The prosecution has the burden of proof and is more likely to call witnesses
than the defense. The declarant is often the victim of the crime, and efforts by the
defendant to admit his own statements as excited utterances are usually deemed to be self-
serving and inadmissible. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The Geraci
exception is a judicially created remedy for misconduct by the defendant and is therefore,
by its very terms, a device for the prosecution. See People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y.
1995). Present sense impressions (typically in the form of 911 calls) are, as is the case with
excited utterances, usually offered by the prosecution. Judicial categorizations of
statements as nonhearsay such as "prompt outcry" or "description of the perpetrator" are
also means for the prosecution to avail itself of out-of-court statements. See infra notes
187-230 and accompanying text.
172 See Robinson, 679 N.E.2d at 1056.
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degree, and sexual misconduct.'73 He claimed that there had been
consensual sex and that his fiancde was a witness. His fianc6e
testified before the grand jury and corroborated his account.
Robinson was then indicted for sexual abuse in the third degree
and sexual misconduct. His fianc6e left New York and refused to
testify at trial. The trial court denied the defendant's application
to have his fianc6e's grand jury testimony admitted at trial.
Traditionally, Criminal Procedure Law section 670.10 is the
sole mechanism for admitting former testimony in criminal cases. 74
That section lists only three proceedings from which former
testimony may be admissible at trial-a criminal trial, a felony
preliminary hearing, or a conditional examination. 175 These three
proceedings are delineated because of the assumption that a full
cross-examination ensures the reliability of the statements made
during the former proceeding. The courts interpret this section
strictly, and former testimony from various hearings and similar
proceedings has been found inadmissible because those
proceedings were not specifically listed in section 670.10.176
The defendant's argument in Robinson, however, was that the
due process clause gave him the right to present reliable evidence
on his own behalf despite state evidentiary rules. The Court of
Appeals held that the grand jury testimony should have been
admitted at trial as an exception to the general prohibition against
hearsay, since the defense established the foundational
requirements of unavailability, materiality, and reliability. Even
though grand jury testimony is generally viewed as insufficiently
reliable because there is not necessarily a full and thorough cross-
examination,77 the grand jury testimony in Robinson revealed that
173 See id. at 1057. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35, 130.65, 130.20 (McKinney
1989).
174 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10 (McKinney 1992). Section 670.10 is entitled,
"Use in a criminal proceeding of testimony given in a previous proceeding; when
authorized." Id.
175 See id.
176 See id.; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text. Just as Geraci does not
represent an expansion of New York Criminal Procedural Law section 670.10, neither
does Robinson. Although the courts in both cases admitted former grand jury testimony,
admission was not premised in either case on statutory construction. In Geraci, the basis
for admission was the court's identification of the need for a public policy exception to
reduce the incentive for witness tampering. See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 822. In Robinson,
the evidence was admitted pursuant to the due process clause and a constitutional analysis.
See Robinson, 679 N.E.2d at 1059.
177 The court in Robinson noted other reasons why grand jury testimony is not
sufficiently reliable-because evidentiary standards are more relaxed in the grand jury
setting and because the proceeding is not subject to public scrutiny. See 679 N.E.2d at
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"the prosecutor's direct examination accomplished the goal of
cross-examination, testing the accuracy of the declarant's
testimony."178
Robinson does not stand for the proposition that exculpatory
grand jury testimony is always admissible. But when the treatment
of the witness in the grand jury is "trial-like," and when the
testimony is materially exculpatory, the defendant's right to due
process mandates its admission even though it falls outside the
narrow confines for former testimony spelled out in Criminal
Procedure Law section 670.10.179
While the Federal Rules of Evidence accord the trial judge
residual discretion to admit hearsay that does not fit within any
delineated exception,18 ° the New York common law has not
explicitly adopted a similar rule. The federal residual provision
has generated a large amount of controversy. Although the
legislature intended it to be used sparingly,"' many scholars have
concluded that the residual exception has overwhelmed the rule.182
The result, claim the critics, has been an unprecedented increase in
the admission of extrajudicial statements. 83 For some time, it
appeared that the Court of Appeals would continue to reject any
type of catchall exception. The court addressed this issue squarely
in People v. Nieves,184 holding that the statements in question
1059 n.2.
178 Id. at 1061. The court also noted that even the grand jurors posed questions to the
witness. See id. at 1060.
179 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10 (McKinney 1992). Already, cases are being
reversed on the grounds that the trial court improperly excluded grand jury testimony
offered by the defense. See, e.g., People v. James, 661 N.Y.S.2d 273 (App. Div. 1997).
180 Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were recently combined into Rule
807, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] statement not specifically covered by Rule
803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule." FED. R. EvID. 807.
181 See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 651 (1998)
("Admittedly, the residual exceptions ... were probably intended for use only in unusual
situations .... ); Rossi, supra note 10, at 1279 ("Congress envisioned a limited role for the
residuals, intending to keep the hearsay exclusion intact and operating along traditional
lines."); see also, e.g., BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, § 804(5).2, at 748 (referring
to the Senate Committee report which indicated that the residual exception should be
used "'very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances"').
182 See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations:
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551 (1996); Myrna S. Raeder,
The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the
Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 925 (1992); Rossi, supra note 10, at
1271-72; David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two
Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982).
183 See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 182; Raeder, supra note 182.
184 492 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y. 1986).
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"were admissible only if the People demonstrated that they fell
within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule." '185
Robinson represents significant movement away from the
court's position in Nieves. A careful reading of Nieves, however,
foreshadows Robinson's result. Addressing the prosecutor's
argument in Nieves that the statements were sufficiently reliable to
be admitted, the court stated: "[W]e are not prepared at this time
to abandon the well-established reliance on specific categories...
particularly in criminal cases where to do so could raise
confrontation clause problems."'86  In Robinson, the defendant
sought admission of the evidence. The due process clause was
implicated, but the confrontation clause was not. Accordingly,
Robinson represented an apt vehicle for the court to introduce
something akin to the Federal Rules of Evidence's residual
exception for reliable evidence that does not fit within any pre-
existing hearsay exception.
III. RE-EXAMINING TRADITIONAL PROHIBITIONS
As a general rule, a crime victim may not testify at trial about
his or her statement to the police concerning either the specific
facts of the crime or the perpetrator's appearance. The victim's in-
court testimony about what he or she told the police out-of-court is
both inadmissible hearsay and improper bolstering through the use
of prior consistent statements. Over time, the New York courts
have crafted exceptions to these prohibitions and, over the past
decade, these exceptions have expanded beyond their narrowly
drawn original parameters.
A. Prompt Outcry
According to the New York Court of Appeals:
Evidence that the victim of a sexual attack promptly
complained has long been deemed admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, the premise being that prompt complaint
was "natural" conduct on the part of an "outraged female," and
failure to complain therefore cast doubt on the complainant's
veracity; outcry evidence was considered necessary to rebut the
adverse inference a jury would inevitably draw if not presented
with proof of a timely complaint.'87
185 Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 People v. Rice, 554 N.E.2d 1265, 1266 (N.Y. 1990) (citing RICHARDSON, supra note
15, § 292).
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Subsequently, the court elaborated that evidence of a sexual
assault victim's prompt complaint was admissible "to corroborate
the allegation that an assault took place." '188 Statements admitted
under the "prompt outcry" theory are not hearsay because they
are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.'89 As the name
of the "exception" suggests, to be admissible the complaint must
have been made promptly after the crime. 19° Given its underlying
rationale, the rule only permits evidence that a timely complaint
was made, but does not allow testimony concerning details of the
incident.'
Here, as with many hearsay exceptions, the temporal element
is a crucial factor.92  Webster's defines "prompt" as "performed
readily or immediately.' '193 In People v. McDaniel,194 the court held
that a complaint was timely for purposes of the prompt outcry
exception if it was made "at the first suitable opportunity." '195
Courts have taken an expansive view in defining what constitutes
the first suitable opportunity. For example, in People v.
Vanterpool,19 6 the victim complained to her cousin "within three
weeks" of the incident.197 The court in Vanterpool held this time
frame to be sufficiently prompt because of the victim's unspecified
188 People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1993). The court acknowledged that
recent studies suggest that it is not unusual for a rape victim to remain silent, but held the
prompt outcry exception to remain necessary because "our judicial process cannot remove
from every juror all subtle biases or illogical views of the world." Id. at 269 (quoting State
v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 374 (N.J. 1990)).
189 For the definition of hearsay in New York State, see, for example, Nieves, 492
N.E.2d at 112, which defined hearsay statements as "out of court [statements] sought to be
introduced for the truth of what [they] assert[]." See also FED. R. EVID. 801(c)
("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); see also,
e.g., People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1978); RICHARDSON, supra note 15, § 200, at
176 ("[A] statement made out of court, that is, not made in the course of the trial in which
it is offered,.., is hearsay if it is offered for the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement."). Although the Court of Appeals has stated that prompt outcry statements
are nonhearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, many
commentators question this premise. See, e.g., MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.2.4, at
735 (arguing that the prompt outcry doctrine is "dubious as a matter of hearsay analysis"
since the outcry "has no probative value unless it is assumed to be a true allegation").
190 See McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d at 269.
191 See Rice, 554 N.E.2d at 1266.
192 For a discussion of the importance of the timing of the declarant's statements in the
context of excited utterances, see supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text, and in the
context of present sense impressions, see supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
193 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 942 (9th ed. 1990).
194 611 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1993).
195 Id. at 269 (quoting People v. O'Sullivan, 10 N.E. 880 (N.Y. 1887)).
196 625 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1995).
197 See id. at 39.
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''young age" and "her expressed fear of serious punishment from
her mother if she disclosed the fact of her rape. '
Recall that the timing of the statement in relation to the event
is also crucial to the determination of whether a statement
qualifies as an excited utterance. Even so, there is no particular
amount of time after which a statement automatically ceases to be
an excited utterance.199 The situation regarding prompt outcry is
similar. °0 Courts consider the parameters of "first suitable
opportunity" by focusing on various factors, including the victim's
age, the proximity of the perpetrator, and the availability of
individuals to whom the victim can reach out.2 1  The liberal
interpretation of the time factor has led, necessarily, to the
increased use of the prompt outcry category of out-of-court
statements.
After a court determines that an out-of-court statement is a
prompt outcry, it must determine what portion of the statement is
admissible. If the statement is admitted for the sole purpose of
establishing that a timely complaint was made, the details of the
complaint are irrelevant. However, in McDaniel, the prosecutor,
at trial, asked the complainant's mother whether her daughter
complained to her about the incident.2 2 The complainant's mother
answered: "[Y]es." While purporting to limit the evidence of
prompt outcry to the fact that a complaint was made, the court
permitted the prosecutor to elicit "the nature of the complaint. 2
3
Accordingly, the court did not strike the prosecutor's question:
"[W]hat was the substance of the complaint? '2t 1  Nor did the court
strike the witness's response that her daughter told her that the
defendant had "bothered her," "attacked her," and "tried to
molest her. 25
Subsequent cases have admitted outcry, statements that go
198 Id.
199 See supra note 28. It is easy to imagine scenarios where statements could be offered
as either excited utterances or as evidence of a prompt outcry. Given a choice, the
prosecution would surely prefer that the court admit the statement as an excited utterance
and therefore for the truth of what the statement asserts.
200 See, e.g., MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.2.4, at 736 ("There is no talismanic time
period for 'promptness."').
201 See, e.g., People v. Santos, 662 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1997); People v. Bott, 651
N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1996); People v. Thomas, 574 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1991);
People v. Maldonado, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at 27 (N.Y. App. Term. 1997).
202 See McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d at 269.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 267.
205 See id. at 267,269.
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beyond the "nature of the complaint." For example, in People v
Newsome, °6 the court found that a note written by the complainant
to her mother qualified as prompt outcry and permitted the entire
note to be admitted into evidence. °7 Once again, critical focus
remains on the complainant20 -- courts are increasingly willing to
take an expansive view of what constitutes "the nature of the
complaint" when the victim is a child.20 9
The question remains: Who is permitted to testify about the
outcry, the declarant or the listener? Suppose the complainant
testifies about what she told the police had happened to her.
Should the court permit the police officer to testify about what the
complainant told her? Prompt outcry does not refer to a hearsay
exception. Rather, prompt outcry refers to statements that are not
offered for the truth of what they assert, and therefore are not
hearsay. Given that classification, the availability of the
declarant-an essential inquiry in any hearsay analysis-is not
directly implicated.210
Of course, the issue remains whether that testimony
constitutes impermissible bolstering. The answer lies in the
rationale for the prompt outcry rule. According to the court in
People v. Rice,211 statements are admitted to "rebut the adverse
206 635 N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 1995).
207 See generally People v. Boddie, 640 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that the
testimony of the treating physician and nurse concerning the victim's statements to them
was relevant to treatment and diagnosis and did not exceed the scope of the prompt outcry
exception); People v. Guerra, 571 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1991) (stating that the
testimony of the complainant's sister that complainant told her that complainant had been
raped and that defendant was the rapist was properly admitted as prompt outcry).
208 For examples of use of the complainant's age as a factor in determining the "first
suitable opportunity," see supra notes 196-98, 201 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 656 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255 (App. Div. 1997) ("[G]iven the
child's age, ability to communicate, and fear of defendant, the outcry evidence was
properly admitted and did not contain excessive detail."); People v. Arredondo, 642
N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (App. Div. 1996) (permitting some detail of the incident, given that the
victim was a young child and was not fully able to communicate what occurred); People v.
Aybinder, 626 N.Y.S.2d 150, 150-51 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that the complainant's poor
English necessitated the admission of some details of the sexual assault); People v. Pace,
535 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (App. Div. 1988) ("Some detail would have been appropriate, given
the age of the victim and her unfamiliarity with terms referring to sexual acts and parts of
the anatomy, in order to insure that she was clearly and unambiguously relating that she
had been raped.").
210 Exceptions to the rule against hearsay are divided according to the declarant's
availability. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. Some exceptions allow for the admission of
hearsay even if the declarant is available to testify, while others require as a precondition
to admissibility that the declarant be unavailable. See id. Prompt outcry, bearing as it
does on the witness's credibility, would seem to require that the declarant be available.
211 554 N.E.2d 1265 (N.Y. 1990).
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inference a jury would inevitably draw if not presented with proof
of a timely complaint. '21 2 Is the adverse inference so strong that
courts should permit both the declarant and the listener to testify
as to the nature of the outcry? The courts indicate so. In fact,
outcries to different listeners at different times have been upheld,
provided that each individual outcry was sufficiently "prompt." In
those cases, courts permit the complainant to testify about her
outcries to several different people at several different times, and
also permit all listeners to testify.213
B. Descriptions of the Perpetrator
In the 1990s, a new form of "nonhearsay" emerged with
profound significance. In People v. Huertas,214 the victim testified
about both the description of the individual who raped her and the
description she had given to the police. As an out-of-court
statement, the testimony about the victim's report to the police
was subject to challenge as inadmissible hearsay as well as
impermissible bolstering through a prior consistent statement.
Rather than determining whether a hearsay exception was
available, the court held that the statements were not hearsay
because they were not offered for their truth.2 "5 The court found
that the offered statements were presented to assist the jury
evaluation of the witness's opportunity to observe the crime, as
well as the reliability of the witness's memory at the time of the
corporeal identification 6.2 1  Therefore, the testimony was properly
admitted for nonhearsay purposes. As with the prompt outcry
212 Id. at 1266 (citing RICHARDSON, supra note 15, § 292).
213 See, e.g., People v. Santos, 662 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1997) ("[T]he seriatim
outcries to two different listeners were admissible since they were both prompt under the
circumstances."); People v. Boddie, 640 N.Y.S.2d 47, 47 (App. Div. 1996) (allowing both
treating physician and nurse to testify with regard to complainant's statements); People v.
Fabian, 625 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding seriatim outcries to different
listeners); People v. Williams, 581 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 1992) (permitting five witnesses
to repeat victim's statement about her rape did not constitute improper bolstering);
People v. Thomas, 574 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1991) (allowing two police officers to
testify that complainant reported incident to them); People v. Guerra, 571 N.Y.S.2d 279
(App. Div. 1991) (permitting complainant's sister to testify that complainant told her that
complainant had been raped a short time earlier, and police detective to testify that
complainant told him the next morning about the rape); People v. Maldonado, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 3, 1997, at 27 (N.Y. App. Term. 1997) (stating that repetition of prompt outcry
evidence does not constitute improper bolstering and permitting complainant and
stepfather to testify about her outcry to him).
214 553 N.E.2d 992 (N.Y. 1990).
215 See id. at 995-96.
216 See id.
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category of nonhearsay, commentators question the underlying
rationale for this "exception" and assert that the basis for
admission of the prior description depends on its truth. 17
The parameters of this form of nonhearsay have also
increased in scope. For example, Rice, which was decided the
same day as Huertas, held that testimony of the complainant and
police officers regarding the description of the perpetrator given
by the complainant to the police immediately after the rape was
not properly received as prompt outcry. 18 However, the court
cited Huertas for the proposition that it is not the case that "such
testimony is never admissible under any theory. '219 The scenario
that now unfolds with regularity in trials across the state is that the
victim and the police officer both testify as to the out-of-court
statements describing the perpetrator.2 °
Similar to the issues surrounding prompt outcry statements,
the propriety of allowing the testimony of the listener as well as
that of the declarant is questionable. 1 If the rule's purpose is to
assist the jury in evaluating the witness's opportunity to observe
and the reliability of her memory,22 2 it is sufficient that the witness
testify about the description she gave the police. It is unclear how
permitting the listeners (police officers) to repeat what the
declarant told them will serve to advance the purpose of the rule.
Instead, the trial devolves into the witness's bolstering of her own
testimony and the police officers' bolstering of her testimony yet
223again.
Although the genesis for this nonhearsay exception was a rape
case, Huertas, leading many to the conclusion that it would be so
cabined, the underlying rationale for the doctrine is not limited to
217 See supra note 189 and accompanying text (producing a similar argument with
respect to prompt outcry); see, e.g., MARTIN ET AL., supra note 20, § 8.2.4, at 734 (arguing
that the distinction in Huertas between hearsay and nonhearsay is "murky at best").
218 See People v. Rice, 554 N.E.2d 1265, 1266-67 (N.Y. 1990).
219 Id. at 1266.
220 See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 666 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1998); People v. Read, 644
N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1996); People v. Perkins, 624 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. 1995);
People v. Messier, 594 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div.1993); People v. Griffin, 569 N.Y.S.2d 97
(App. Div. 1991); People v. Guerra, 563 N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Div. 1990); People v.
Poliakov, 561 N.Y.S.2d 435 (App. Div. 1990).
221 See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
222 See People v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 992, 996 (N.Y. 1990).
223 In essence, the witness testifies as to what the perpetrator looked like. The witness
then testifies as to the description of the perpetrator that she gave to the police. The
police then testify as to the description that the witness gave to them. This level of
repetitious bolstering of prior consistent statements seems well beyond what is necessary
to satisfy the goal enunciated in Huertas.
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a specific charge.224 Recent cases have applied this logic to various
charges, including murder,225  manslaughter, 6  robbery,227
undercover drug sale, 228 attempted murder,229 and burglary.23 °
IV. CONSEQUENCES
A. Out-of-Court Statements Versus In-Court Testimony
As more evidence is admitted under the general rubric of
furthering the search for the truth, the trier of fact is increasingly
put in an untenable position.23' With expanding frequency, the
factfinder hears conflicts between the declarant's out-of-court
statements and his or her in-court testimony. This result is
inevitable as standards for admission are relaxed and more
extrajudicial statements are received into evidence.
The New York Appellate Division, Second Department,
confronted this recurring problem in People v Rawlings.232 In
Rawlings, a police officer arrived at the scene of a shooting and
encountered a man crouched over a shooting victim. The man,
who was hysterically screaming and crying, told the police officer
that the defendant committed the crime. The police officer
testified and recounted the excited utterance. However, when
called to the witness stand, the man testified that "he did not
actually see the defendant shoot the deceased."23' The jury thus
was placed in a quandary. The jury heard out-of-court statements
because they fit within an exception to the hearsay rule and were,
therefore, reliable. However, the declarant of this presumably
224 It is important to bear in mind that Huertas and Rice were decided the same day and
both involved rape cases. Rice, in particular, was concerned explicitly with the unique
issues that arise in rape prosecutions. However, it is clear that the logic of prompt outcry
espoused in Rice extends to all types of sexual assaults. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 574
N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1991).
225 See People v. Dixon, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1996).
226 See People v. Poliakov, 561 N.Y.S.2d 435 (App. Div. 1990).
227 See People v. Phillips, 666 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1998); People v. Read, 644
N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1996); People v. Griffin, 569 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1991);
People v. Williams, 562 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1990).
228 See People v. Hues, 664 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1997); People v. Person, 632
N.Y.S.2d 601 (App. Div. 1995); People v. Tinner, 618 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1994).
229 See Dixon, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 1; People v. Guerra, 563 N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Div. 1990).
230 See People v. Sutherland, 645 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1995); People v. Perkins, 624
N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. 1995); People v. Messier, 594 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 1993).
231 See infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
232 632 N.Y.S.2d 206 (App. Div. 1995).
233 Id. at 207. There is no evidence in the record that the man's testimony was in any
way the result of the defendant's misconduct.
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reliable statement then ca~st doubt upon its trustworthiness. The
appellate court held that "[a]ny error ... in failing to strike the
police officer's testimony of [the man's] excited utterance was
harmless. 2 34  One possible remedy, therefore, is to strike the
excited utterance from the record.
The Court of Appeals recently addressed this fact pattern in
People v. Fratello,235 where the victim of an attempted murder was
also the declarant of the out-of-court statements. During the
prosecution's direct case, the trial court admitted two excited
utterances into evidence. The shooting victim at the scene made
the admitted utterances to a civilian and a police officer. In both
instances, the victim named -the defendant as his shooter. Prior to
trial, the defense submitted an affidavit from the victim wherein he
recanted his earlier statements and maintained that the defendant
was not the shooter. As a result, the prosecution did not call the
victim as a witness, but instead called the civilian and the police
officer to testify about the victim's out-of-court-statements. The
victim was called as a defense witness. On direct examination, he
denied that the defendant shot him, and on cross-examination he
denied ever having told anyone that the defendant was the man
who shot him.236 Once again, the factfinder had to resolve the
unusual discrepancy between the witness's out-of-court statements
and his in-court testimony. During the bench trial, the trial judge
resolved the incongruity by finding the defendant guilty. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "the trial court ... had a
sufficient, non-speculative basis to resolve the contradictions
between [the victim's] out-of-court statements implicating [the]
defendant in the crimes, and his exonerating testimony at the
trial. '237 Thus, it was permissible to credit the excited utterances
over the in-court testimony and convict the defendant on the basis
of those extrajudicial, unsworn statements. 38
234 Id.
235 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998).
236 Apparently, there were no allegations raised that the defendant's misconduct caused
the witness to alter his testimony.
237 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1178.
238 See id. at 1176-77. The court addressed at length the rationale of People v. Jackson,
480 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 1985). The court in Jackson held that "[w]hen all of the evidence of
guilt comes from a single prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing
both to guilt and innocence, the jury is left without basis, other than impermissible
speculation, for its determination of either." Id. at 732. The defendant in Fratello argued
that dismissal was required as a matter of law, given that the prosecution's case was based
on the victim's statements, which were directly contradicted by his in-court testimony. See
Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176. The court disagreed, finding that Jackson did not create a
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The predicament of conflicting statements from the same
witness often occurs in cases where the prosecution alleges that the
defendant's misconduct has caused the witness to become
unavailable. In People v. Geraci,239 the conflict arose at the pretrial
Sirois24 ° hearing devoted to determining whether the defendant
was responsible for the witness's unavailability. Two police
investigators testified for the prosecution and recounted threats
that the witness had reported to them. The witness, who also
testified, denied that he saw who committed the crime, and also
denied having ever been threatened. Nevertheless, the court held
that the prosecution had proven, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the witness had been threatened. 24 1 The prosecution was able
to prove its allegations of misconduct by relying on hearsay-
including the police investigators' recollections of what the witness
told them-and was, therefore, permitted to prove its case at trial
by relying on hearsay. Put another way, the prosecution was
allowed to use the witness's hearsay at trial because it proved its
allegations of misconduct through hearsay at the hearing. The
holding in Geraci is especially significant because the witness's
hearsay, in the form of his grand jury testimony, was the crux of
the prosecution's case at trial.42 The conviction rested primarily
on hearsay that the declarant repudiated at the pretrial Sirois
hearing. 43
The Court of Appeals faced the same dilemma in People v.
Cotto.44 At the Sirois hearing, a detective and a police officer
testified regarding threats that the witness had reported to them.
However, the witness testified that the defendant was not the
perpetrator, and that he had neither been threatened nor told the
police he had been threatened. Contrary to this testimony, the
trial court held that the witness had in fact been threatened. 45
per se rule and the trier of fact may reach a verdict if there is an objective, rational basis
for resolving the witness's contradictory version of events. See id. at 1177.
239 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995).
240 This hearing is named after the defendant in People v. Sirois, the case at issue in
Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App. Div. 1983). In Holtzman, the court
spelled out the procedures for determining whether the defendant's misconduct caused
the witness's unavailability. See id. at 597.
241 See Geraci, 649 N.E.2d at 824.
242 Indeed, the witness did not even testify at the trial.
243 Similarly, in Fratello, the repudiated hearsay was the basis for conviction.
Moreover, the hearsay that constituted the heart of the prosecution's evidence in Fratello
was in the form of unsworn excited utterances. See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176-78. At
least the hearsay in Geraci, in the form of the declarant's grand jury testimony, was given
under oath.
244 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
245 See id. at 398.
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Once again, the prosecution proved its allegations through
hearsay, and was permitted to use hearsay to prove the charges at
trial.246 Cotto presented an additional problem. Unlike the witness
in Geraci, the witness in Cotto testified, albeit briefly, at the trial
and again denied, in front of the jury, that the defendant was the
perpetrator. After the Sirois hearing, the prosecution was able to
admit into evidence, through the testimony of the police officers,
statements made by the witness when he named the defendant as
the perpetrator. The jury was stuck in the increasingly familiar
quandary of first hearing the witness testify that the defendant was
not the perpetrator, and then hearing police officers testify that the
witness told them that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator.
The defendant was eventually found guilty and the conviction was
affirmed.247
B. Codification
Many lessons can be learned for the codification debate. It
appears that the arguments of codification's supporters and
opponents have been turned on their heads. Those in favor of an
evidence code believe that common law development occurs in
piecemeal fashion, since courts can only address issues as they are
presented in particular cases. 48 Moreover, supporters argue that
"[s]ystemic changes or revisions of a complicated set of principles
is simply not possible" through common law evolution.14 9 One
commentator observed that "New York's common law system
provides a classic example of the slow pace of judicial reform," and
that the courts are the "wrong forum if development of the law is
[the] goal." 250 Written laws, as opposed to common law
development, are viewed as the best, if not the only, way to revise
evidence rules.
Opponents of codification argue that all modern codes vest
the trial judge with too much discretion, which leads, in turn, to
increased admissibility.2 1 They contend that the courts, not the
246 In Cotto, unlike in Fratello and Geraci, there was significant additional evidence of
guilt beyond the repudiated hearsay. See id. at 397-99 (presenting all of the evidence
against defendant).
247 See Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 400.
248 See Salken, supra note 6, at 672-73.
249 Id. at 673.
250 Id. at 686.
251 See, e.g., John R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (1985). See generally id. at 692 ("That
codification along the federal model has broadened admissibility is not seriously
debated."); Rossi, supra note 10, at 1276 ("Codifications like the Rules, in keeping with
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legislature, should make evidence law, and that maintaining
common law development of evidentiary rules will serve to contain
the modern trend toward admissibility.252
Both supporters and opponents of codification appear to have
been mistaken. The Court of Appeals has shown itself to be a
highly effective agent of reform, systematically overhauling New
York hearsay jurisprudence. Far from effecting change in a
gradual or piecemeal way, the court has purposefully reshaped the
hearsay landscape on a grand scale, leading to a profound increase
in the number of out-of-court statements admitted at trial. 3
Opponents of an evidence code, who want the judiciary to develop
the evidentiary laws, should, as the saying goes, be careful what
they wish for. Far from curtailing or controlling the modem
admissibility movement, the New York Court of Appeals has
jumped to the forefront and taken a significant role in expanding
the reach of admissible hearsay.
The overriding purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to
foster the search for the truth.2 4  Rule 102 provides specifically
that the goal of the Rules is to ensure "that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. ' '255  Pursuit of the
truth, especially when coupled with a discretionary, residual
hearsay exception, will inevitably lead to greater admissibility. 6
The Court of Appeals, without either a statutory catchall hearsay
exception or a mandated goal of searching for the truth, has
modern trends, tend to facilitate admissibility.").
252 See Salken, supra note 6, at 692.
253 In the recent case of People v. James, No. 92, 1999 WL 444267 (N.Y. July 1, 1999),
the Court of Appeals took an expansive view of yet another hearsay exception, this time
broadly interpreting the exception for statements relating to a declarant's state of mind.
254 See D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the
Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 290
(1989).
255 FED. R. EvID. 102. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1794 (1994) (stating
that the purpose of evidence law is to aid in the search for the truth).
256 See David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 937 (1990). It is by no means clear that the objective of discerning the truth is best
achieved through increased admissibility of out-of-court statements. The genesis for the
rule against hearsay was the concern that these statements, since not made under oath or
subject to cross-examination, were unreliable and therefore impacted negatively on the
factfinder's pursuit of truth and justice. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, §
801.1(a), at 546 ("The rule prohibiting hearsay evidence was developed to insure that the
declarant had the opportunity to perceive the event, had the memory necessary to recall
the event, and had the ability to accurately narrate the event."); MCCORMICK, supra note
20, § 245, at 726-28. Adopting a more permissive approach toward admissibility leads to
valid concerns that the truth-seeking function of the trier of fact may actually be hindered,
due to the injection of less trustworthy evidence into the trial.
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followed suit. Commentators have cogently observed that "[t]he
New York Court of Appeals on more than one occasion has been
influenced by one or another of the federal rules ... indicating that
a process of integration is already underway. ' 257 In fact, the trend
toward admissibility indicated in the Federal Rules of Evidence is
part of New York's common law tradition. A quarter century ago,
the New York Court of Appeals observed that "this court has in
recent years emphasized that the hearsay doctrine has been too
restrictively applied to exclude otherwise reliable evidence from
the jury. ' 258 As one scholar noted, "[i]ronically, if there is a hope
for reducing the effect of this liberalization movement, it may be in
the process of codification itself. 259
Another argument offered in opposition to codification is that
placing the law of evidence in the hands of lawmakers will likely
result in the politicization of evidentiary rules, as the legislature is
seen as especially susceptible to public pressure and opinion.260 It
is equally clear, however, that the judiciary is not immune to these
influences.26' It could certainly be argued that the Court of
Appeals has been responsive to public sentiment. Categorization
of statements as nonhearsay grew out of rape cases and a general
belief that jurors were deliberating with a series of inappropriate
and inaccurate assumptions. The burgeoning use of expert
testimony is another example of judicial reaction to changing
times. Following the crack cocaine epidemic of the mid-1980s,
New York courts began permitting the prosecution to offer more
and more police officers as expert witnesses in drug cases.
Suddenly, it became routine in cases involving the sale of drugs for
257 BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at vii.
258 People v. Arnold, 309 N.E.2d 875, 875 (N.Y. 1974) (concerning statements made by
the deceased); see, e.g., People v. Nieves, 488 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (App. Div. 1985)
(referring to the quote in Arnold as "perhaps one of the most important judicial
pronouncements on evidence in many years").
259 Salken, supra note 6, at 695.
260 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 10, at 1277; Salken, supra note 6, at 696.
261 See, e.g., Salken, supra note 6, at 694 ("[T]here is little that is more disconcerting to a
trial judge than to find his or her name on the front page of the local newspaper because of
a[n allegedly] pro-defendant decision."). Interestingly, statistics reveal that since 1978, the
percentage of defendants' applications for leave to appeal granted by the Court of
Appeals has dropped from 6.4 percent to less than 2 percent. See Mark Gimpel, Court
Should Lead in Criminal Justice, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at 2. Moreover, the court ruled
in favor of the prosecution in 81 percent of the cases decided from September, 1997, to
July, 1998, up from an average of 57 percent of the cases heard from 1986 to 1993. See
Paul Shechtman, Prosecution Wins Frequently in Term Marked by Moderation, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 5, 1998, at S4. One commentator suggested that the hearsay rule could erode further
in the future because fear of crime might cause both legislators and judges to weaken the
protections afforded to criminal defendants. See Park, supra note 181, at 657.
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a police witness to testify to the intricacies of street-level drug-
dealing and try to explain why a particular defendant did not
possess any drugs or prerecorded buy money at the time of his
arrest.62 Commentators have suggested that New York courts are
moving away from the "beyond the ken" standard for the
admission of expert testimony and toward the less restrictive, pro-
admissibility helpfulness test.263 Indeed, New York Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye once described the role of
common law judges as "cautiously and creatively developing the
law in ways appropriate to a changing society. ' 264  To the extent
that codification opponents believed that the Court of Appeals
would simply maintain the evidence law status quo, they were
apparently mistaken.
CONCLUSION
Whether by expanding existing hearsay exceptions, adopting
new ones, or categorizing classes of statements as nonhearsay,
recent rulings by the Court of Appeals have led to a substantial
increase in the use of out-of-court statements at trial. By
admitting new classes of evidence, the court has dramatically
revised the nature of the proof that jurors are permitted to hear.
An unintended, but predictable, consequence has been a
proliferation of situations where declarants' out-of-court
statements conflict with their in-court testimony. These
anomalous scenarios place factfinders in perplexing situations and
require further articulation of the rapidly changing evidentiary
landscape.
The New York Court of Appeals has long been a leader in
advancing the law through common law development. The court
has refined and modernized the law of evidence, paralleling a
trend toward increased admissibility already evident in the federal
courts. Although New York will enter the next century still
without an evidence code, one can expect the law of evidence in
New York to continue to rapidly and purposefully evolve pursuant
to the court's development of the common law.
262 See, e.g., People v. Graves, 654 N.E.2d 1094 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Garcia, 633
N.E.2d 1094 (N.Y. 1994).
263 See Rossi, supra note 165, at 682-83. The Federal Rules, by removing certain
common law barriers, have also led to an increased use of expert testimony and a
corresponding increase in the admission of hearsay. See Rossi, supra note 10, at 1271,
1276.
264 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).
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